The Price of Loyalty
I just finished reading The Price of Loyalty, a book about Bush’s first secretary of the Treasury, Paul O’Neill, written by former Wall Street Journal reporter Ron Suskind.
What struck me most about this book was how likable I found O’Neill. Anyone who knows me knows of my aversion to business wheeling and dealing, to CEOs and the arena of stuffed whiteshirts and fancy yachts, getaways in the Hamptons, and what not. O’Neill, while not entirely of that fabric, did come to be a member of Bush’s first cabinet from the head of steel industry giant Alcoa.
Further back on O’Neill’s résumé are gigs such as: he was assistant director of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for Richard Nixon; he served Gerald Ford as deputy director of OMB; and then he was appointed by George H. W. Bush to chair an advisory group on education. Bush 41 originally offered O’Neill secretary of Defense. But because he had just started his tenure at Alcoa, O’Neill turned it down, recommending his old friend Dick Cheney for the job instead.
I’m giving this background to show the circumstances under which I came to like O’Neill. He was chosen to join Bush 43’s team, ostensibly, based on these credentials. His government and private sector leadership over three decades made him a perfect choice.
But what the Bush posse underestimated was one of O’Neill’s most formidable qualities: his love of inquiry and truth. In addition to this, or perhaps because of it, there was another aspect of O’Neill’s personality the administration honchos would soon learn to abhor: his distaste for politics, especially when it trumps the truth.
Suskind does a pretty remarkable job mixing his narrative with equal parts detail and mood. He takes the reader on a not-always-linear journey, from O’Neill’s early dealings with government up to his mystical, spy-novelesque recruitment by Bush and Cheney.
O’Neill’s tenure in Bush 43’s cabinet is marked by a pattern: the Treasury secretary would meet with Federal Reserve Chairman (and economic guru) Alan Greenspan (the book portrays the two as being almost exclusively in agreement on fiscal policy); then O’Neill would take their conclusions to the president. The first of these ideas was to tie Bush’s initial round of tax cuts to so-called “triggers.” The idea was to wait and see if the projected surplus would actually materialize, and if so, how big it would be, then proceed cutting taxes.
But on tax cuts, as on Iraq and the Middle East, Bush heard his treasury secretary out in their one-on-ones, and said nothing. O’Neill notes throughout The Price of Loyalty the absence of intellectual curiosity, debate, or inquiry on the part of the president.
The bit about the National Security Council meetings being obsessed from day one (February 2001) with Iraq and removing Saddam Hussein are noteworthy, as is the other half of that policy: complete disengagement from the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Certain obvious members of the administration came to town to do the work they had been planning throughout the late-90s, as they foamed at the mouth over Clinton’s policy of head-on engagement.
Suskind also writes of O’Neill’s somewhat famous tour of Africa with Bono. At every stop, O’Neill would make calculations, trying to figure out how “inexpensive” it would be to get water wells for the communities he was touring. The implication, of course, is that with water, so many positive things can happen, the least of which is the ability to treat infectious diseases.
This all, of course, has striking relevance now, as the U. S. economy still appears backed against the ropes, the war in Iraq drags on with no end in sight, the plan for Social Security privatization has fallen apart (in part because there was no money to make the transition thanks to tax cuts and the squandering of the surplus), and now, finally, the president’s popularity has taken a hit. It’s ironic that now, nearly three years down the road from when O’Neill was told over the phone by Dick Cheney, “the president has decided to make some changes to the economic team, and you’re part of that change,” the country could use an honest broker like him.
